The Return of the M23: Conflict, Capture, and Continuity in Eastern Congo

Matthew Parish, Associate Editor

In the dense, mineral-rich hills of North and South Kivu, in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), war never ends — it only changes shape. The resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23), a Tutsi-led rebel group, has once again plunged the region into crisis, with frontlines shifting, civilians fleeing, and regional powers engaged in a complex geopolitical dance. The group’s renewed offensive, particularly since 2022, has raised fears of a return to large-scale warfare in the heart of Africa’s most enduring conflict zone.

To understand the current advance of the M23 in North and South Kivu, one must situate the group within the broader 20-year arc of instability in the Great Lakes Region — an arc shaped by genocide, regional interventions, mineral exploitation, and cycles of betrayal and broken peace deals.

Origins of the M23: Born of a Broken Accord

The M23 movement emerged in 2012, named after the 23 March 2009 peace agreement signed between the Congolese government and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a former Tutsi-led rebel group backed by Rwanda. That accord was meant to integrate the CNDP’s fighters into the Congolese national army (FARDC), giving them ranks and protections in return for disarmament.

But grievances festered. M23 leaders — including military commander Sultani Makenga and political figure Bosco Ntaganda (later convicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes) — claimed that the Congolese government had failed to honour the terms of the 2009 deal, particularly concerning the protection of Congolese Tutsis and the political inclusion of former rebels.

In April 2012, these officers defected from the army and launched a rebellion under the banner of the March 23 Movement. Within months, M23 captured Goma, the capital of North Kivu, dealing a humiliating blow to the Congolese state. The occupation was short-lived — under heavy diplomatic pressure from the United Nations and Western governments, M23 withdrew in December 2012. By 2013, a coordinated offensive by the Congolese army and the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) drove M23 into neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda, where its fighters were supposed to be disarmed and exiled.

Resurgence in 2021–2024: A Familiar Spectre Returns

After nearly a decade of dormancy, the M23 began rearming and reorganising. In late 2021, its fighters launched renewed attacks in North Kivu, quickly gaining territory in Rutshuru, Nyiragongo, and later Masisi. In 2022 and 2023, the group expanded its operations, displacing hundreds of thousands and threatening major urban centres once more. By mid-2024, M23 had seized control over critical stretches of territory between Goma and the Ugandan border, including towns like Bunagana, Kiwanja, and Rutshuru Centre.

The group has demonstrated tactical agility, using guerrilla-style ambushes, advanced communication equipment, and local intelligence networks to outmanoeuvre FARDC and affiliated militias. Their ranks now reportedly include former CNDP and M23 veterans, new recruits from Congolese Tutsi communities, and — according to multiple UN and independent reports — logistical and military support from Rwanda, a charge Kigali denies but which has been supported by consistent evidence over the years.

Regional Politics and Allegiances: Rwanda, Uganda, and the Cross-Border Struggle

The M23 cannot be understood in isolation from the strategic interests of Rwanda and Uganda, both of which have long intervened militarily and economically in eastern Congo. Rwanda’s involvement is often framed around two core concerns:

1. Security of her western border from the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), a Hutu rebel group operating in eastern Congo with links to the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide.

2. Influence over mineral-rich zones in eastern DRC, which serve as lucrative sources of coltan, cassiterite, and gold — resources critical to the global electronics industry.

Kigali views Congolese Tutsis — particularly the Banyamulenge and other minority communities in the Kivus — as historically marginalised and vulnerable to violence from Hutu-aligned militias and Mai-Mai groups. Rwanda’s interventions are thus often justified on the basis of protecting these communities. However, many analysts see these justifications as cover for more expansive economic and strategic ambitions.

Uganda, too, has a history of supporting rebel factions in Congo, though its role in M23’s latest resurgence appears less central than Rwanda’s. Nevertheless, Kampala maintains complex ties with both Kinshasa and Goma, and regional peace efforts have often featured Ugandan mediation.

Seized Territory and Humanitarian Fallout

The M23’s recent offensives have had a catastrophic impact on civilians. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over one million people have been displaced since 2022 in North Kivu alone. Camps around Goma, Sake, and Minova are overcrowded, undersupplied, and vulnerable to cholera outbreaks, gender-based violence, and malnutrition.

The group’s occupation of strategic roads and towns has also crippled trade routes, exacerbating food insecurity and limiting access for humanitarian organisations. Reports have emerged of forced recruitment, extrajudicial executions, and restrictions on civilian movement in M23-controlled zones. While the group presents itself as a protector of local communities, its governance is enforced through fear, surveillance, and arbitrary rules.

UN Peacekeeping and the Congolese State: An Eroding Mandate

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the country since 1999. At its height, it was one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations in the world. But its credibility has deteriorated sharply. Congolese civilians increasingly see MONUSCO as passive, bureaucratic, and ineffective.

The Force Intervention Brigade, once lauded for defeating the original M23 in 2013, has been unable to replicate that success. Meanwhile, the Congolese army (FARDC), plagued by corruption, weak command structures, and low morale, often struggles to mount coordinated responses. It frequently relies on irregular militias or so-called “patriotic youth” groups, further undermining discipline and exposing civilians to abuse.

Broader Context: The Great Lakes Cycle of Conflict

The resurgence of M23 is not an isolated phenomenon. It reflects deeper, unresolved dynamics in the Great Lakes Region:

• The legacy of the Rwandan Genocide and the dispersal of Hutu and Tutsi populations into neighbouring countries.

• The collapse of state authority in eastern Congo, where dozens of armed groups still operate.

• The competition for natural resources, with transnational networks smuggling minerals across porous borders.

• The failure of peace agreements to address land rights, ethnic representation, and justice for victims of violence.

Eastern Congo has experienced two major wars (1996–1997 and 1998–2003), involving at least nine African states and leaving over five million people dead, mostly from preventable causes like disease and starvation. The region remains a laboratory of state failure and international neglect, with each new conflict reminding the world that war in the Congo is never entirely over — it only pauses, metastasises, and returns.

Conclusion: A Crisis in Motion

The renewed rise of M23 is a warning. It tells us that without genuine regional accountability, inclusive governance, and serious demilitarisation of politics in the Great Lakes Region, armed groups will always find room to operate — and civilians will continue to pay the price.

As of 2025, the situation remains volatile. Diplomatic talks led by the es. The Congolese state is simultaneously preparing for elections and waging war. Regional alliances shift like shadows on the Virunga Mountains.

And yet, the people of North and South Kivu persist — cultivating fields under fire, raising children amidst chaos, and dreaming of peace in a region that the world too often forgets until the fighting flares again. The M23, both symptom and actor in this long war, is not the whole story. But its advance is a painful reminder that history in eastern Congo is not only being written by statesmen and diplomats — but also by armed men in the forests, moving forward with old grievances and new guns.