Loss of Russian refinery capacity

By Matthew Parish, Associate Editor

Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries have created two very different numbers: a large headline share of capacity “hit”, and a much smaller reduction in what Russia actually refines after she rearranges flows and uses spare plant. The interesting question is how to reconcile the two.

In doing so we need to address three issues:

What is Russia’s nominal refinery capacity and how much of it has been attacked or temporarily shut?
How much throughput has really been lost once spare and redundant capacity are taken into account?
What proportion of capacity is, in effect, removed from Russia’s practical war economy, even if she keeps national fuel supplies roughly stable for the time being?

Russia’s refining system and spare capacity

Russia has one of the world’s largest refinery systems. Most recent industry and Reuters estimates put total primary refining capacity at around 6.5–6.6 million barrels per day, roughly 320–330 million tonnes per year.

However she has not run that system flat out. Pre-war and early-war data suggest that only about 270 million tonnes per year were actually processed, implying that roughly 20–22 per cent of nameplate capacity was idle in a normal year because of old equipment, regional overcapacity, seasonal maintenance, and economics. In other words even before Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign intensified, Russia had a built-in cushion of unused or under-used refining units.

That spare capacity matters enormously. It means that destroying or disabling a given refinery unit does not translate mechanically into the same percentage loss of national fuel production. Crude can be diverted to other refineries, some idle units can be restarted, and product flows can be re-routed, at least up to a point.

Headline capacity “hit” by Ukrainian strikes

Across 2024 and 2025, various institutions have tried to measure how much Russian refining capacity has been affected by Ukrainian drones and, occasionally, missiles.

Some key data includes the following:

In early 2024, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that up to 600,000 barrels per day of Russian refinery capacity could be offline in the second quarter due to Ukrainian strikes, around 10–14 per cent of total capacity.
Around the same period, a NATO official suggested that Ukrainian attacks had “hit” about 15 per cent of Russian refining capacity, although not all of that was simultaneously offline.
More detailed work by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, looking at March 2024, estimated net disruptions of about 380,000 barrels per day, which they framed as roughly 6 per cent of total Russian refining capacity once compensating for increases at non-attacked plants were factored in.

In 2025, the scale and tempo of Ukrainian attacks increased sharply:

By October 2025 analyses of the plants struck since August suggested that the refineries attacked represented about 123 million tonnes per year of capacity out of roughly 327 million tonnes, an “on paper” 38 per cent of Russia’s total.
Reporting by Ukrainian and Western media has repeatedly referred to “nearly 40 per cent” of refining capacity being idle or disabled at certain points in 2025, particularly during the autumn fuel crisis.
A number of open-source assessments aimed for more conservative central figures, suggesting that somewhere in the 10–20 per cent range of nameplate capacity has been physically damaged or periodically disrupted in 2025.

The most recent daily reporting is broadly consistent with this. In November 2025, Ukrainian drones and missiles disabled roughly 20 per cent of Russia’s refinery capacity in a new wave of attacks, although this did not translate into the same fall in total output.

So if we ask, in simple headline terms, “what proportion of Russian refinery capacity has been hit or temporarily forced offline by Ukrainian strikes”, a fair range for 2025 would be:

Plants representing about one-third to two-fifths of total nameplate capacity have been struck or temporarily shut at some point,
But only around 15–25 per cent of capacity has tended to be offline at any given peak moment, depending on the wave of attacks, maintenance schedules, and repair progress.

Those are gross numbers before we think about Russia’s ability to use redundant capacity elsewhere.

Throughput and the effect of redundancy

Once redundant capacity is included, the picture looks more modest at the national level, although it is still severe in particular regions and product segments.

Several strands of evidence point in the same direction:

The IEA noted in 2024 that while the upper estimate of refinery outages looked substantial, Russia’s official weekly data on refinery runs still showed crude processing of about 5.0–5.2 million barrels per day, only modestly below pre-attack levels. The agency explicitly observed that redundant crude distillation capacity could negate much of the headline impact.
An Oxford Energy paper found that, for March 2024, net disruptions were around 6 per cent of total Russian refining capacity after allowing for increased throughput at non-damaged plants.
A comment piece using Capital Economics’ estimates concluded in late 2025 that despite media claims of 10–20 per cent of capacity being impacted, the actual reduction in throughput looked closer to 3–4 per cent on an annual basis.
Recent Reuters reporting, echoed by Russian and independent outlets, indicates that in 2025 Russian oil processing has fallen by only about 3 per cent year-on-year, even though up to 20 per cent of capacity was offline at different moments and at least 17 major refineries were attacked.
A Kyiv Post summary from November 2025 makes the same point starkly: about 20 per cent of capacity temporarily disabled, but only a 3–6 per cent drop in actual refining output once spare capacity at other plants was brought online.

In parallel, we see strong evidence that Russia is straining the system to achieve this apparently modest loss:

Nearly 40 per cent of refining capacity has been idle at some points, and attacks account for the majority of shutdowns, but Russia has leaned on imports of gasoline and adjustments in product exports to keep its domestic market functioning.
Industry sources concede that Russia’s refineries were running “well below full capacity” before the attacks and that they have compensated by restarting spare units and accelerating repairs after strikes.

Putting this together, a plausible national picture for 2025 is:

Nameplate capacity physically hit or periodically disrupted: perhaps 30–40 per cent at some point.
Capacity actually offline at a given peak: typically 15–25 per cent, sometimes less as repairs progress.
Net loss of effective throughput at the national level, after using spare and redundant capacity: roughly 3–6 per cent of Russia’s total refining output so far.

On that basis, if one asks “what proportion of Russian refinery capacity has been reduced by Ukrainian strikes, given redundant capacity”, the best single-figure answer is not the dramatic 30–40 per cent sometimes quoted, but something closer to a mid-single-digit share in terms of sustained annual throughput, at least so far.

Where redundancy helps Russia – and where it does not

Redundant capacity cushions the blow in several ways.

First, Russia can increase runs at refineries that were previously under-utilised or had units idle for economic reasons. Analysts note that at least about one-fifth of total capacity was habitually idle before the war, which creates room for substitution.

Secondly, Moscow can change the mix of what is produced. Some of the most damaging Ukrainian strikes have been on secondary units such as catalytic crackers and reformers that are crucial for high-octane petrol, diesel and jet fuel. Those are harder to replace, but Russia can offset the loss in part by exporting more crude instead of refined products, importing finished fuels from partners such as Belarus and Asian suppliers, and relaxing technical standards to stretch domestic supply.

Thirdly, some attacks have coincided with or been folded into planned maintenance, allowing Russia to pretend, statistically, that the outages are merely cyclical. Reuters data for 2024, for example, show total offline refinery capacity for the year rising significantly compared with 2023 as “maintenance” volumes climbed, even though a substantial part of that maintenance was unscheduled damage repair.

However, redundancy has limits:

Regional shortages have already appeared. Washington Post reporting describes a roughly 20 per cent monthly shortfall in petrol output by late 2025, leading to rationing in a number of regions, with Crimea among the hardest hit.
The quality and product mix can worsen. Losing secondary units reduces the ability to make cleaner, high-value products, which matters for both export markets and modern military needs.
Sanctions make repairs harder. Replacing damaged foreign-supplied components such as compressors, control systems and catalysts is increasingly difficult; Russia is improvising with domestic and Chinese supplies, but this increases costs and time, and may degrade performance.

Hence Russia can use redundant capacity to absorb a substantial share of the physical damage, but she pays for it through higher costs, inferior products, regional shortages, and a gradual erosion of the system’s resilience.

A reasoned estimate of the “true” proportion reduced

If we try to crystallise the situation into one answer that takes redundancy seriously, there are three different “proportions” one might mean:

Share of nominal capacity at sites that have suffered successful Ukrainian strikes.

– Roughly one-third to two-fifths, on current public estimates.
Share of capacity actually offline at peak moments, before compensation elsewhere.

– Typically in the 15–25 per cent range during the heaviest waves of attacks in 2025, according to a mixture of government, NATO and industry sources.
Share of Russia’s effective national refining capability, after exploiting spare capacity and accepting some loss of product availability and quality.

– Presently on the order of 3–6 per cent, judging by observed reductions in total refinery throughput and the best available net-outage estimates.

From a purely military-economic perspective, it is the third figure that matters most. A state waging a major war cares about how much fuel it can actually deliver to its armed forces and critical industries, not about nameplate capacity on paper. By that metric, it is reasonable to say that Ukraine has, for now, shaved a mid-single-digit proportion off Russia’s effective refining capability, at the cost to Russia of having to burn through her spare capacity, rearrange logistics, import more fuel, and run down maintenance margins.

Yet it would be misleading to dismiss the higher headline figures as mere propaganda. The fact that roughly a third of Russia’s refining system has already been physically hit or disrupted, and that around one-fifth of capacity may be offline in any given wave of attacks, tells us something about the long-term trajectory. Every repaired unit draws on scarce parts and skilled labour; every emergency restart consumes the redundancy that would otherwise cushion future shocks.

If Ukrainian strikes continue at their present rate, the effect of redundancy will erode. What is currently a 3–6 per cent effective loss could grow, over the next one to two years, into a more structural degradation of Russian refining, especially in the production of high-value light products. At that point, the proportion of capacity “reduced” in a meaningful sense will begin to converge upwards towards the larger headline figures that are already circulating.

Strategic implications

Against that background, one might summarise the proportion question like this:

In the short run, Russia’s redundant refinery capacity means that Ukraine’s strikes look more dramatic on maps than in aggregate throughput data. Nationally, only a small share of effective refining capacity has been lost so far.
In the medium run, the campaign is forcing Russia to use up redundancy, rely on imports, and accept regional shortages and quality problems. That is already visible in petrol rationing and emergency import measures.
In the long run, if Ukraine can continue to hit a rotating subset of refineries equal to one-third or more of the system’s nameplate capacity, while sanctions restrict high-quality repairs, the true proportion of Russia’s usable refining capacity that is permanently reduced will rise inexorably.

If one must give a single figure “given redundant capacity”, the careful answer is: Ukraine has so far knocked out something like 5 per cent of Russia’s effective national refining capability, even though plants representing up to about 40 per cent of nominal capacity have already been within the cross-hairs. The gap between those two numbers is where Russia’s redundancy lives – and where, over time, Ukraine is trying to make her bleed.

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