Central Asia’s shifting alliances

By Matthew Parish, Associate Editor

Sunday 10 May 2026

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the five republics of Central Asia — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — in a peculiar geopolitical condition. Independent in law, they nevertheless remained deeply integrated into Russian systems of transport, military organisation, finance, language and political culture. Moscow inherited not merely influence but infrastructure: pipelines ran north, military academies remained Russian, migrant labour flowed to Russian cities, and local elites often emerged from Soviet administrative structures that had survived almost intact. For much of the first three decades after independence, it appeared that Russia would remain the unchallenged hegemonic power in Central Asia.

That assumption is now weakening.

The war in Ukraine has accelerated a profound strategic recalibration across the region. While none of the Central Asian states wishes openly to confront Moscow, each has begun cautiously diversifying her alliances, trade routes and security relationships. What is emerging is not a clean geopolitical divorce from Russia, but rather a gradual transition towards what regional leaders often describe as “multi-vector” diplomacy — a balancing strategy designed to prevent domination by any single great power.

Russia’s weakening position has several causes. The first is military. Before 2022 Russia’s armed forces were perceived across the former Soviet sphere as overwhelmingly dominant. The invasion of Ukraine shattered much of that aura. Central Asian leaders observed not only Russia’s battlefield difficulties, but also the extent to which Moscow became economically and technologically dependent upon China after Western sanctions intensified. The Kremlin still possesses immense coercive capabilities, but she no longer appears invincible.

Secondly the war in Ukraine created anxiety in Central Asia about sovereignty itself. Russian nationalist rhetoric questioning Ukrainian statehood resonated uncomfortably in Kazakhstan in particular, where substantial Russian-speaking populations inhabit northern provinces adjacent to Russia. Kazakh officials have therefore pursued a notably careful diplomacy — avoiding direct criticism of Moscow while simultaneously strengthening relations with China, the European Union, Türkiye and the Gulf monarchies. Kazakhstan has refused formally to recognise Russia’s annexations in Ukraine and has shown increasing willingness to comply, at least partially, with Western sanctions regimes designed to prevent sanctions circumvention. This balancing act would have been politically unthinkable a decade ago.

China has emerged as the principal beneficiary of this transformation. Beijing’s influence in Central Asia has expanded steadily since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, but the process accelerated dramatically after 2022. Trade between China and the Central Asian republics reached record levels in 2025, while Beijing deepened cooperation in energy, mining, infrastructure and transport. China’s strategic logic is straightforward. Central Asia provides overland trade corridors to Europe that bypass maritime chokepoints and increasingly avoid Russian territory itself. The long-discussed China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway has acquired entirely new significance because sanctions and instability have complicated transit routes through Russia.

Yet China’s growing influence differs fundamentally from Russia’s historical dominance. Moscow traditionally sought political subordination and military integration. Beijing generally seeks commercial integration and strategic access. China does not demand ideological conformity, nor does she attempt to recreate an imperial political bloc. For Central Asian elites this makes Chinese power simultaneously attractive and unsettling. Chinese investment brings roads, railways and industrial development, but also risks debt dependency and economic asymmetry.

Türkiye has also become increasingly important. Shared linguistic and cultural heritage amongst the Turkic-speaking states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and, more ambiguously, Turkmenistan — has enabled Ankara to cultivate influence through the Organization of Turkic States. Turkish defence exports, military training programmes and educational institutions have expanded throughout the region. Turkish drones, which acquired considerable prestige during the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine, have become symbols of a new middle-power military technology sector capable of competing with Russian equipment.

This Turkish connection is significant not merely for practical reasons but also psychologically. It offers Central Asian governments an alternative civilisational framework distinct from both Russian imperial nostalgia and Chinese technocratic authoritarianism. Ankara presents herself as a modern Turkic power with NATO membership, Islamic heritage and independent geopolitical ambitions. For leaders in Astana and Tashkent especially, Türkiye provides an additional balancing mechanism against overdependence on either Moscow or Beijing.

The European Union has likewise intensified engagement with Central Asia. The 2025 EU–Central Asia summit in Samarkand represented a milestone in relations between Brussels and the region. Investment initiatives focused on transport corridors, critical minerals and energy diversification have become increasingly important.   European policymakers increasingly view Central Asia through the lens of strategic autonomy: a source of rare earth minerals, uranium and alternative trade routes circumventing Russia.

The so-called “Middle Corridor” — a transport network linking China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Türkiye — exemplifies this geopolitical reorientation. Historically, Eurasian rail freight moved overwhelmingly through Russian territory. The Middle Corridor seeks to bypass Russia altogether. Although still constrained by infrastructure limitations, the project has gained enormous political support since the invasion of Ukraine.

The United States remains less economically engaged than China or the EU, but Washington too has intensified her regional diplomacy. Agreements concerning critical minerals, particularly with Uzbekistan, demonstrate American efforts to secure alternative supply chains independent of both China and Russia. American strategy increasingly views Central Asia as part of a broader competition over logistics, energy and mineral access across Eurasia.

Nevertheless declarations of Russia’s imminent eclipse in Central Asia would be premature.

Russia retains deep structural advantages. Millions of Central Asian migrant workers continue to depend upon employment in Russia, and remittances remain essential to the economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russian remains the lingua franca of administration and elite communication throughout much of the region. Russian media still exerts enormous cultural influence. Military relationships also remain extensive. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remain within the Eurasian Economic Union.

Moreover Central Asian leaders themselves remain cautious. None wishes to provoke Moscow into hostility. The region’s governments have observed how Russia responded to perceived geopolitical drift in Ukraine and Georgia. Consequently their foreign policies are characterised not by rupture but by hedging — incrementally reducing dependency while avoiding overt confrontation.

An equally important development is the rise of indigenous Central Asian regionalism. Historically the republics often competed more with one another than with external powers. Border disputes, water conflicts and nationalist rivalries repeatedly obstructed regional cooperation. That situation has begun to change. Landmark agreements resolving disputes between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan suggest a growing recognition that collective regional coordination strengthens their bargaining position vis-à-vis larger powers.   Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan increasingly act as regional middle powers seeking to shape Central Asia as a coherent geopolitical entity rather than merely a collection of post-Soviet buffer states.

This may prove the most important transformation of all. During the nineteenth century Central Asia was the object of imperial competition between Britain and Russia. During the Soviet period she became an internal colonial hinterland of Moscow. During the early post-Soviet decades, she remained politically fragmented and strategically reactive. What is emerging now is the possibility that Central Asia may begin behaving as an autonomous geopolitical region in her own right.

The process remains incomplete and fragile. Economic weakness, authoritarian governance, corruption and infrastructure dependency continue to constrain the region’s strategic freedom. China’s rise may simply replace one form of dependency with another. Russia’s influence, though diminished, remains substantial. Yet the direction of travel is unmistakable.

Central Asia is no longer merely drifting away from Russia. It is learning, slowly and cautiously, how to manoeuvre amongst multiple powers simultaneously — exploiting rivalries between Moscow, Beijing, Brussels, Ankara and Washington to maximise her own sovereignty. The age of exclusive Russian predominance in Central Asia appears to be ending. What replaces it, however, is not a new empire but a more complicated and unstable multipolar order.