Iran: Donald Trump’s Forever War

By Matthew Parish, Associate Editor

Wednesday 15 July 2026

The phrase “forever war” entered the American political vocabulary as a criticism of the seemingly endless military campaigns that followed the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Donald Trump rose to political prominence in part by denouncing precisely these interventions. He criticised the invasion of Iraq as a strategic blunder, questioned the utility of prolonged nation-building in Afghanistan and promised American voters that he would end costly overseas entanglements. Yet history has an enduring capacity for irony. If the United States now finds herself entering a prolonged confrontation with Iran, it may be remembered as Donald Trump’s own forever war.

This is not because the United States necessarily intends to occupy Iran, nor because American forces are likely to become embroiled in a conventional campaign resembling Iraq in 2003. Rather it is because the strategic logic of confrontation with the Islamic Republic lends itself almost inevitably to persistence. Iran is too large to conquer, too resilient to intimidate quickly and too deeply embedded in the politics of the Middle East to isolate completely.

Unlike Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Iran possesses a sophisticated state bureaucracy, an extensive indigenous military-industrial base and a political elite that has survived decades of sanctions, diplomatic isolation and covert pressure. She has become remarkably adept at absorbing punishment while avoiding outright defeat. That resilience makes decisive victory elusive for any external power.

Iran has also perfected the art of indirect warfare. For decades she has invested in regional proxy organisations, political movements and allied militias stretching from Lebanon to Iraq, Syria, Yemen and beyond. These relationships are not simply military alliances. They represent networks of influence, ideology, logistics and intelligence that cannot be dismantled by destroying a handful of military facilities.

Every successful strike against Iranian infrastructure therefore carries the possibility of retaliation elsewhere. Shipping in the Gulf, missile attacks against American partners, cyber operations against western infrastructure and pressure through regional proxies all become instruments in an escalating contest without obvious geographical boundaries.

This creates an uncomfortable strategic dilemma. If the United States responds forcefully to each Iranian action, escalation becomes almost automatic. If it exercises restraint, Tehran may conclude that deterrence has weakened. Neither course offers a clear path towards finality.

Trump’s own political instincts complicate matters further. His foreign policy has always rested upon the concept of strength combined with unpredictability. He has often argued that adversaries should never know precisely how Washington will respond. That doctrine may generate tactical advantages during isolated crises, but prolonged confrontations reward consistency more than surprise.

Iranian strategic culture has historically displayed extraordinary patience. The leadership in Tehran has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to pursue objectives over decades rather than electoral cycles. American presidents face elections every four years. Iranian leaders often think in generational terms. Time itself therefore becomes an asymmetric weapon.

Economic considerations further reinforce the danger of permanence. Iran remains a significant energy producer located beside one of the world’s most strategically sensitive maritime chokepoints. Even limited instability in the region can produce volatility in global energy markets, shipping insurance and international investment. Every confrontation therefore acquires worldwide economic consequences, encouraging outside powers to involve themselves diplomatically or strategically.

Russia and China are unlikely to become direct military participants, but neither has an interest in seeing American influence strengthened across the Middle East. Both possess incentives to sustain relations with Tehran while avoiding commitments that expose themselves to unnecessary risk. This creates opportunities for Iran to mitigate western economic pressure while preserving diplomatic options.

Nor should one underestimate the domestic political dynamics within Iran herself. External military pressure has historically strengthened rather than weakened nationalist sentiment. Even Iranians deeply critical of their own government may react differently when faced with foreign military action. National identity and regime legitimacy are not identical, yet conflict often causes them temporarily to converge.

The United States also confronts a problem familiar from previous interventions. Military power can destroy physical assets with astonishing speed, but political objectives are rarely achieved through destruction alone. If the strategic aim is merely to degrade Iranian military capabilities, periodic strikes may suffice. If the objective is fundamentally to alter Iranian behaviour or transform the regional balance of power, military operations alone are unlikely to prove decisive.

This is the essence of the forever war problem. Tactical successes accumulate while strategic resolution remains elusive. Every operation creates conditions that justify another. Each temporary pause merely postpones the next crisis.

Trump’s supporters might reasonably argue that overwhelming strength can restore deterrence and thereby prevent prolonged conflict. Critics may contend that military pressure inevitably generates further resistance. Both arguments contain elements of truth.

History offers examples supporting each proposition. Yet neither guarantees a stable outcome in the uniquely complex environment of the contemporary Middle East.

Perhaps the greatest danger lies not in dramatic escalation but in gradual normalisation. Missile exchanges become routine. Cyber attacks become expected. Proxy conflicts continue across multiple theatres. Sanctions intensify, negotiations collapse and occasional direct military strikes punctuate an otherwise permanent state of strategic hostility. The war never fully begins because it never fully ends.

America’s experience since 2001 demonstrates how easily extraordinary military measures become enduring policy. Administrations change, rhetoric evolves and priorities shift, yet the underlying conflicts persist. Institutions adapt themselves to permanent mobilisation, budgets reflect continuing confrontation and political debate increasingly concerns management rather than termination.

Donald Trump entered American politics promising to end forever wars. Yet if confrontation with Iran evolves into an indefinite campaign of coercion, retaliation and strategic competition, his presidency may instead become associated with creating another one.

The ultimate tragedy would not be measured solely in military expenditure or regional instability. It would lie in the gradual acceptance that permanent conflict has become a normal instrument of international relations. History suggests that once nations reconcile themselves to such conditions, escaping them becomes immeasurably more difficult than entering them.