Reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine

By Matthew Parish, Associate Editor

Saturday 2 May 2026

The latest reform programme for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, announced by Volodymyr Zelenskyy and driven by Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, represents one of the most consequential attempts since 2022 to reconcile the demands of a prolonged industrial war with the human limits of a mobilised society. It is at once a reform born of exhaustion and one shaped by technological transformation.

What has been outlined thus far is not a single reform but a constellation of interlocking changes. At its centre lies the problem of manpower. Ukraine’s war effort has reached a stage at which numerical inferiority, compounded by attrition and declining enthusiasm for mobilisation, has become a structural constraint. The reform therefore seeks to address recruitment, retention and morale in tandem.

The most immediate and politically salient measure is financial. Pay for soldiers is to be increased significantly, with a new “fair-pay” model distinguishing more sharply between combat and non-combat roles. Non-combat salaries are to rise to at least 30,000 hryvnias monthly, while infantry contracts may reach several hundred thousand hryvnias depending on exposure to risk. This is not merely a matter of generosity. It reflects an implicit recognition that infantry service has become the most dangerous occupation in Europe, dominated by persistent drone surveillance and strike capabilities, and therefore must be compensated accordingly if it is to remain viable.

Closely connected is the introduction of a new contract system. This promises clearer terms of service, including defined durations and the possibility of phased demobilisation for long-serving troops. In a war where many soldiers have served continuously for years, the absence of predictable rotation or discharge has become corrosive. The reform acknowledges this by seeking to restore a sense of temporal structure to military service.

Rotation policy itself forms a third pillar. Recent directives from the high command impose limits on frontline deployment durations and mandate rest periods, an attempt to prevent the physical and psychological degradation of units. The fact that such measures had to be ordered following public controversy reveals the extent to which the existing system had drifted into unsustainable practices.

Beyond personnel policy, the reform also gestures towards deeper structural change. There is an ongoing transition towards a corps-based command system, intended to improve operational coherence and reduce fragmentation amongst brigades. Simultaneously the Ministry of Defence is pursuing digitisation of mobilisation processes, including automated deferment systems, in order to reduce corruption and administrative inefficiency. These efforts are complemented by broader experimentation with technological warfare, particularly the integration of drones, artificial intelligence and private-sector innovation into operational planning.

Taken together these reforms indicate a shift in Ukrainian military thinking. The early war emphasis on mass mobilisation and heroic endurance is giving way to a more systematised model, one that seeks to balance human sustainability with technological leverage. The ambition is clear: to transform a wartime army of necessity into a warfighting institution capable of indefinite conflict.

Yet the announced measures, substantial though they are, remain incomplete. They address symptoms more directly than causes, and their success will depend upon deeper reforms that are only partially articulated.

The first of these concerns mobilisation legitimacy. The Ukrainian state has struggled with public trust in the draft system, particularly in relation to perceived inequities and abuses by recruitment authorities. Reform of territorial recruitment centres, still under discussion, is therefore essential. Without a system regarded as fair, no amount of increased pay will fully resolve the manpower deficit.

Then there is the question of force composition. The war has demonstrated the vulnerability of traditional infantry formations to precision strike systems. Ukrainian doctrine has already begun to adapt, with drones responsible for a substantial proportion of battlefield lethality. A desirable reform trajectory would accelerate the substitution of machines for men in the most dangerous roles — not merely through procurement, but through doctrinal reconfiguration. This implies a smaller, more specialised infantry component supported by dense networks of unmanned systems.

Thirdly, logistics and command culture remain areas of concern. Reports of inadequate provisioning and overstretched units suggest that organisational reform must extend beyond formal structures to encompass accountability mechanisms. The transition to a corps system will only succeed if accompanied by a culture of decentralised initiative and reliable supply chains. Otherwise it risks becoming a nominal reorganisation without operational effect.

Ukraine also faces a fiscal constraint that shadows all reform efforts. Increased pay, expanded contracts and technological procurement all impose significant costs on a state heavily dependent upon foreign assistance. A sustainable reform programme must therefore be aligned with long-term financing arrangements, whether through allied support or domestic economic restructuring.

Finally, there is the strategic question of what kind of army Ukraine seeks to become. The reforms hint at a hybrid force: part mass army, part high-technology strike system. Whether this synthesis can be achieved in practice remains uncertain. It requires not only resources but also a coherent doctrine integrating manpower, machines and operational art.

The reforms announced today should be understood less as a finished blueprint than as an inflection point. They acknowledge that the conditions of 2022 no longer apply — that Ukraine is engaged in a protracted contest in which endurance must be engineered, not merely improvised.

If successful, these reforms will do more than improve morale or efficiency. They will redefine the relationship between Ukrainian society and her armed forces, transforming military service from an open-ended sacrifice into a structured, compensated and technologically mediated endeavour. If they fail, the consequences will be equally profound — a gradual erosion of manpower, legitimacy, and ultimately the capacity to sustain the war.

The stakes therefore are not administrative but existential. Ukraine is attempting, in the midst of war, to redesign the machinery of her own survival.