Middle Powers, International Law and the Limits of Idealism

By Matthew Parish, Associate Editor

Monday 13 July 2026

When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed the World Economic Forum in January 2026, he acknowledged a reality that many governments had long preferred not to confront openly. The post-Cold War rules-based international order, he argued, had not merely weakened but suffered a fundamental rupture. Great powers were increasingly disregarding legal constraints, weaponising trade, finance and technology while treating international institutions as instruments of convenience rather than binding forums for cooperation. In this new environment, Carney proposed that middle powers should forge closer concordats based upon international law, shared values and practical cooperation in order to preserve stability and prevent the international system descending into pure geopolitical competition.

The proposal possesses both intellectual appeal and considerable moral force. Yet whether it represents a practical blueprint for the future depends upon difficult questions concerning power, interests and the uneven application of international law itself.

International lawyers have long understood that law between states differs fundamentally from law within states. Domestic legal systems possess legislatures, police forces and courts capable of enforcing judgments. International law possesses none of these in any comprehensive sense. Compliance depends ultimately upon consent, reciprocity and political calculation. The absence of a universal enforcement mechanism means that international law functions most effectively when the interests of powerful states broadly coincide with legal obligations. When those interests diverge, legal principles frequently become subordinate to strategic necessity.

Carney himself recognised much of this contradiction. Rather than nostalgically defending the post-Cold War order, he admitted that it had always rested upon selective application. Powerful countries frequently exempted themselves from rules they expected others to observe. Trade disputes were enforced unevenly. Military interventions were judged according to political alliances rather than consistent legal principles. Human rights often became instruments of diplomacy rather than universally applied standards.

This candour distinguishes Carney’s argument from many previous defences of the so-called rules-based international order. He does not pretend that the previous system was fair. Instead, he argues that recognising its imperfections should encourage middle powers to build something more honest and more resilient.

That ambition deserves serious consideration.

Middle powers occupy an increasingly significant position within international politics. Countries such as Canada, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Poland, Türkiye, Brazil and South Africa possess substantial economic resources, diplomatic influence and military capabilities without individually dominating the international system. Collectively they account for a large proportion of global production, trade and technological innovation.

The logic behind closer cooperation is therefore compelling. Acting individually, middle powers are vulnerable to economic coercion from larger states. Acting collectively, they can diversify supply chains, coordinate sanctions policy, strengthen international institutions and reduce dependence upon any single hegemonic power.

However, this attractive vision immediately encounters profound practical obstacles.

The first concerns the extraordinary diversity among middle powers themselves.

Some are consolidated liberal democracies. Others are authoritarian states. Some belong to NATO. Others maintain strategic partnerships with Russia or China. Several pursue deliberate policies of geopolitical balancing, seeking simultaneously to benefit from relationships with competing great powers. Their economic structures differ dramatically, as do their security priorities and domestic political systems.

Consequently, identifying common legal principles proves considerably easier than sustaining common strategic interests.

A second difficulty concerns the continuing ambiguity surrounding international law itself.

Legal principles often appear clear in abstract form. The prohibition upon aggressive war, the sovereignty of states and the protection of civilians enjoy widespread acceptance. Yet their practical application frequently becomes contested.

Questions surrounding humanitarian intervention, cyber operations, economic sanctions, recognition of governments, maritime claims and emerging technologies continue to divide states that otherwise profess support for international law. Even among democratic allies, disagreements frequently arise over the interpretation of treaty obligations or the legality of military action.

A coalition founded upon international law therefore cannot avoid the perennial question: whose interpretation of international law should prevail?

The challenge becomes even more acute when examining recent conflicts.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents one of the clearest violations of the prohibition upon aggressive war since 1945. Few legal scholars dispute this conclusion. Yet elsewhere, debates surrounding interventions in Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Gaza or Iran reveal far greater disagreement over the relationship between legality, legitimacy and necessity.

If middle powers wish genuinely to restore confidence in international law, consistency becomes indispensable.

Carney himself has suggested that identical standards should apply to allies and rivals alike. That principle may prove the most important element of his entire proposal. International law derives much of its authority not from coercive enforcement but from perceptions of impartiality. Whenever states appear willing to overlook violations committed by friends while condemning identical conduct by adversaries, legal credibility inevitably suffers.

Yet achieving such consistency requires political courage rarely displayed by democratic governments, whose foreign policies inevitably reflect electoral pressures, alliance obligations and economic interests.

There is also a broader philosophical question concerning the relationship between power and law.

Classical realists from Thucydides onwards have argued that international politics ultimately reflects the distribution of power. Liberal institutionalists, by contrast, maintain that institutions and legal norms gradually shape state behaviour even where immediate incentives point elsewhere.

Reality almost certainly lies somewhere between these positions.

Power creates opportunities for legal development. Law, in turn, influences how power may legitimately be exercised. Neither entirely replaces the other.

Middle-power cooperation therefore cannot eliminate geopolitical rivalry. It can only moderate its consequences.

Perhaps the greatest contribution Carney’s proposal offers lies not in imagining the disappearance of great-power competition but in recognising that smaller states retain agency even within an increasingly fragmented international environment.

Coalitions need not seek military confrontation with larger powers. Instead, they may coordinate standards for artificial intelligence, climate policy, maritime security, financial regulation, anti-corruption measures and digital governance. They may strengthen dispute-resolution mechanisms, share intelligence concerning sanctions evasion and develop resilient supply chains less vulnerable to political coercion.

Such practical cooperation would strengthen international law indirectly by making lawful cooperation economically and politically advantageous.

Whether this ultimately succeeds will depend less upon eloquent speeches than upon sustained diplomatic commitment.

The emerging international system appears increasingly multipolar. American predominance has weakened. China continues to expand its influence. Russia remains prepared to challenge established norms through military force despite enormous costs. Regional powers increasingly pursue independent strategic agendas rather than automatic alignment with either Washington or Beijing.

Within this environment, middle powers possess genuine opportunities to shape international norms. Yet they can only do so if they resist the temptation to treat international law as a rhetorical instrument deployed selectively according to political convenience.

Carney’s proposal therefore deserves cautious support rather than unquestioning enthusiasm.

His diagnosis of contemporary international politics is persuasive. His recognition that the previous rules-based order often rested upon selective enforcement reflects an honesty too often absent from diplomatic discourse. His belief that middle powers should cooperate more closely is strategically sensible.

Nevertheless, durable concordats cannot rest upon aspirations alone. They require genuine consistency in applying legal principles, acceptance that national interests will sometimes conflict with legal ideals and a willingness to criticise allies as readily as adversaries.

International law remains one of civilisation’s greatest achievements precisely because it aspires to constrain power rather than merely describe it. Whether middle powers can preserve that aspiration in an era of renewed geopolitical rivalry may become one of the defining questions of twenty-first century diplomacy.