Xi Jinping Thought and the New Age of Power

By Matthew Parish, Associate Editor

Thursday 25 June 2026

For much of the twentieth century the ideological vocabulary of the world’s major powers seemed relatively stable. The United States spoke the language of liberal democracy, markets and individual rights. The Soviet Union spoke the language of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian struggle. Europe, after the disasters of two world wars, increasingly spoke the language of integration, regulation and social compromise.

The People’s Republic of China however has in recent years advanced a political doctrine that is neither a straightforward continuation of orthodox communism nor a simple adaptation of Western capitalist ideas. Known formally as “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, it is both a governing philosophy and a statement of national ambition. Whether one admires it or fears it, it has become impossible to understand contemporary economics or international relations without understanding its principal assumptions.

Xi Jinping Thought begins with a proposition that differs fundamentally from much contemporary Western political thinking: the state is not merely an administrative mechanism serving society, but rather the principal organiser of national destiny. The Communist Party of China is presented not as one political actor among many competing interests, but as the institutional embodiment of the Chinese nation itself. Stability, continuity and national rejuvenation therefore become moral as well as political objectives.

This conception reflects a deeper historical memory. Chinese political culture has long emphasised order, hierarchy and competent administration. From imperial bureaucracies to modern party structures, legitimacy has often been associated less with electoral competition than with the capacity to deliver prosperity, security and social harmony. Xi Jinping Thought seeks to place the Communist Party within that historical continuum, portraying contemporary China not as a revolutionary state in permanent upheaval but as the latest expression of a civilisation several millennia old.

The economic implications are profound. During the late twentieth century many observers assumed that economic liberalisation would inevitably produce political liberalisation. China appeared to be following a path already travelled by South Korea, Taiwan and numerous European states. Yet China under Xi Jinping has challenged that assumption.

Instead of retreating from economic management, the state has asserted itself more vigorously in strategic sectors. Industrial policy, technological self-sufficiency and national resilience have become central priorities. The objective is not the elimination of markets; indeed China remains deeply integrated into global commerce. Rather it is the subordination of markets to broader national goals.

This approach has generated considerable success. China has become a global leader in advanced manufacturing, renewable energy technologies, telecommunications infrastructure and increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence systems. State guidance, enormous domestic scale and long-term planning have enabled investments that would be politically difficult in many democratic systems, where electoral cycles often encourage short-term decision-making.

Critics point to inefficiencies, debt accumulation and the risks of excessive centralisation. They note that innovation frequently flourishes where intellectual freedom is greatest and where economic actors are permitted to challenge established assumptions. Yet even critics increasingly acknowledge that the simple dichotomy between state planning and market efficiency no longer captures reality. Xi Jinping Thought has helped legitimise a hybrid model in which market mechanisms operate within a framework of strong strategic direction.

The consequences extend far beyond economics. International relations since the end of the Cold War were often interpreted through the lens of globalisation. Economic integration was expected gradually to soften geopolitical competition. Trade would create mutual dependence; mutual dependence would reduce conflict.

Xi Jinping Thought offers a different perspective. Economic interdependence is valuable, but only insofar as it does not create strategic vulnerability. Hence the emphasis on supply-chain security, technological sovereignty and diversified trading relationships. The concept of “dual circulation” reflects this logic: China seeks both international engagement and the capacity to withstand external pressure.

This has altered the character of great-power competition. Increasingly, geopolitical rivalry is expressed not through territorial conquest but through technology standards, semiconductor production, artificial intelligence, telecommunications infrastructure, rare earth minerals and industrial capacity. Economic policy has become national security policy.

The Belt and Road Initiative illustrates this transformation. To supporters, it represents a vast programme of infrastructure development linking continents through ports, railways, energy networks and digital systems. To sceptics, it is a mechanism for expanding Chinese influence. In reality it is both. Xi Jinping Thought does not sharply separate economics from geopolitics. Infrastructure, trade and diplomacy are viewed as interconnected instruments of national strategy.

The doctrine also reflects a broader intellectual challenge to assumptions that dominated international discourse after 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union encouraged many observers to believe that liberal democracy represented the inevitable endpoint of political development. Xi Jinping Thought rejects that proposition explicitly. It argues instead that different civilisations may pursue different political arrangements while still achieving modernisation and prosperity.

Whether this claim ultimately proves durable remains uncertain. China faces significant demographic pressures, slowing growth, regional inequalities and the difficulties that accompany any highly centralised system. No governing philosophy is immune from practical realities. Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss Xi Jinping Thought as mere propaganda. It is a coherent attempt to answer some of the most important questions of the twenty-first century: how states should govern advanced economies, how nations should navigate technological transformation and how rising powers should define their place in the international order.

For economists, the lesson is that markets do not exist in isolation from political structures. For diplomats, the lesson is that assumptions formed during the brief unipolar moment following the Cold War may no longer be adequate. For the rest of the world, the lesson is simpler still. One need not accept Xi Jinping Thought to recognise its significance.

Ideas matter because they shape institutions, and institutions shape power. In contemporary China, Xi Jinping Thought has become the framework through which economic development, national identity and international influence are increasingly understood. Its ultimate success or failure will be judged by history. But its impact upon the present is already unmistakable.

The twenty-first century may yet become remembered not merely as an era of technological revolution, but as an era in which competing visions of political and economic organisation once again contested the future of the world. Xi Jinping Thought is among the most consequential of those visions — ambitious, controversial and impossible to ignore.