Foucault, Peltzman and the Expanding Technocratic State

By Matthew Parish, Associate Editor
Friday 12 June 2026
One of the most striking political developments of the modern era has been the relentless growth of government. Whether measured by public expenditure, regulatory complexity, administrative personnel or the number of aspects of life subject to official supervision, the state has expanded dramatically across almost every developed society. Two thinkers from very different intellectual traditions sought to explain this phenomenon. Michel Foucault approached the issue through the lens of power, knowledge and social control. Sam Peltzman approached it through economics and public choice theory. Although they wrote in different languages, addressed different audiences and employed entirely different methodologies, their conclusions intersect in intriguing ways.
Foucault’s work was concerned less with government in its conventional political sense and more with the mechanisms by which societies are governed. His concept of “governmentality” described the emergence of a form of rule that depended not primarily upon force but upon expertise. Modern states increasingly justified their authority through claims of scientific knowledge, administrative competence and technical necessity. Doctors, psychologists, statisticians, economists, educators and bureaucrats became essential actors in the exercise of power.
For Foucault, the rise of modern institutions reflected a profound transformation in how power operated. Medieval rulers often governed through direct coercion. Modern states instead sought to shape behaviour. Schools trained citizens. Hospitals classified and managed patients. Prisons disciplined offenders. Census offices categorised populations. Public health authorities monitored biological risks. Individuals came to internalise norms that were presented as rational, objective and scientifically justified.
The technocratic state therefore emerged not merely as a collection of ministries but as an entire network of institutions producing knowledge about society and using that knowledge to regulate conduct. Expertise became a source of legitimacy. Power and knowledge became inseparable.
Sam Peltzman approached the same historical trend from an altogether different perspective. An economist associated with the Chicago School, Peltzman is best known for analysing regulation and the incentives that drive political decision-making. His work challenged the traditional view that government intervention exists primarily to correct market failures or advance the public interest.
Instead Peltzman argued that political actors respond to incentives just as market participants do. Politicians seek votes. Bureaucracies seek larger budgets and greater authority. Interest groups seek benefits from regulation. Once created, regulatory institutions tend to generate constituencies that support their continued existence and expansion.
In Peltzman’s framework, the growth of government is not principally the result of ideological ambition or philosophical transformation. It is the consequence of a series of rational political exchanges. Citizens demand protection from various risks. Politicians promise solutions. Bureaucracies acquire authority to implement those solutions. The result is a cumulative expansion of state activity.
At first glance, Foucault and Peltzman appear to be speaking about entirely different phenomena. Foucault’s language is philosophical, historical and often abstract. Peltzman’s language is economic, empirical and institutional. Yet both challenge idealised accounts of government.
Neither accepts that public institutions simply emerge because society rationally determines what is best. Both reject narratives in which state growth is driven solely by benevolent concern for the public welfare. Both see expansionary dynamics operating beneath official justifications.
For Foucault, these dynamics arise from the relationship between expertise and power. Every new field of knowledge creates new opportunities for intervention. Once a population can be measured, classified and analysed, it can also be managed. The production of knowledge naturally generates new forms of governance.
For Peltzman the dynamic arises from political incentives. Every new intervention creates beneficiaries who support its continuation. Bureaucratic agencies acquire interests of their own. Politicians find advantages in offering additional protections, subsidies and regulations. Government therefore grows because growth serves the interests of influential actors within the political system.
The similarities become even more striking when examining contemporary society. Consider public health. A Foucauldian analysis might emphasise the emergence of epidemiological expertise, disease surveillance systems and behavioural guidance mechanisms that shape individual conduct. A Peltzman-style analysis might focus on the incentives facing public health agencies, elected officials and organised interest groups. Both perspectives explain different dimensions of the same phenomenon.
Likewise in fields such as environmental regulation, financial supervision or digital governance, expertise and incentives reinforce one another. Technical specialists identify risks requiring intervention. Political actors gain support by promising protection from those risks. Bureaucratic institutions then acquire additional authority to manage them.
Yet there remains an important difference between the two thinkers.
Foucault viewed the expansion of technocratic governance as a structural feature of modernity itself. The growth of administrative expertise was embedded in broader transformations in knowledge and social organisation. There was no obvious endpoint because modern societies continually generate new forms of expertise and new categories of management.
Peltzman, by contrast, analysed state growth as the product of identifiable incentives that could theoretically be altered. Better institutional design, stronger accountability mechanisms or more competitive political systems might constrain expansion. His analysis was ultimately more reformist than Foucault’s.
This difference has important implications for contemporary debates. Those influenced by Peltzman often advocate reducing bureaucratic discretion, limiting regulatory powers and increasing transparency. Those influenced by Foucault tend to be more sceptical of the very concept of neutral expertise, questioning whether technocratic authority can ever be separated from power relationships.
The twenty-first century has made both perspectives newly relevant. Artificial intelligence, algorithmic governance and big data have dramatically increased the capacity of institutions to collect information and shape behaviour. Governments around the world also continue to accumulate regulatory responsibilities in response to financial crises, pandemics, cyber-security threats and geopolitical instability.
Foucault helps us understand why expertise increasingly occupies the centre of political life. Peltzman helps us understand why institutions built around that expertise rarely shrink once established. Together they provide a powerful explanation for one of the defining characteristics of modern government: its tendency toward continual expansion.
The enduring lesson is that the growth of the state cannot be understood solely through the intentions of legislators or the rhetoric of political parties. Beneath electoral contests and policy debates lie deeper forces. Expertise generates authority. Authority creates institutions. Institutions develop interests. Interests encourage further expansion. Whether viewed through the philosophical lens of Foucault or the economic lens of Peltzman, the result is remarkably similar—a technocratic state whose reach extends steadily into ever more areas of human life.
For citizens of democratic societies, understanding these mechanisms is essential. The question is not merely whether government should be larger or smaller. The more profound question is how expertise, incentives and power interact to shape the boundaries of freedom itself.
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